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OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Arroyo, 
No. 880062-CA (filed February 15, 1989) is attached as 
Appendix A to this petition. A copy of that Court's order 
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hereto as Appendix B. 
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State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)? 
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OPINION BELOW 
Th^ opinion of fhr* ~ourt of Appeals in State v. Arroyo, 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Cour t: of Appeals filed its opinion on February 
15, 1989 (Appendix A). The Court denied Mr. Arroyo's Peti-
tion for Rehearing on March 22, 1989 (Appendix B). The 
Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari had to be filed. This Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari is therefore timely filed with this 
Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-2-2(5) (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of Proceedings Below. 
Petitioner, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was arrested and 
charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute for Value in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). 
After a preliminary hearing, the Petitioner was bound over 
to the District Court on the narcotics charge. Arroyo moved 
to suppress the evidence asserting that his stop by a high-
way patrol trooper for the traffic violation of "Following 
Too Closely" was a pretext stop. The trial court granted 
the Motion to Suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and an Order Suppressing the evidence on 
January 6, 1989. A copy of the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order are attached hereto as Appendix C. 
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The State of Utah appealed the trial court's suppression 
order. 
On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court's order suppressing the evidence. The court 
held that: 
1. The trial judge's determination that 
the stop of Arroyo's vehicle was an un-
constitutional pretext to search for 
drugs was a correct determination be-
cause a reasonable officer would not 
have stopped Arroyo for "Following Too 
Closely" except for some unarticulated 
suspicion of more serious criminal act-
ivity; 
2. Arroyo, through his counsel, stipu-
lated that he had consented to the 
search of his vehicle and based upon 
misleading conduct by Arroyo's counsel, 
said stipulation also included that the 
consent was given voluntarily; 
3. Although the original illegal stop 
was unconstitutional, Arroyo's subse-
quent voluntary consent purged the taint 
from the initial illegality, and the 
Motion to Suppress was therefore im-
properly granted. 
Mr. Arroyo petitioned for rehearing on the basis that: 
1) the record clearly demonstrated that Arroyo's counsel did 
not stipulate that Arroyo had either consented or volunta-
rily consented to the search of his vehicle; 2) the trial 
judge never reached any legal conclusions on the voluntari-
ness of the consent; and 3) even assuming that Arroyo volun-
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tarily consented to the search of his vehicle, the State did 
not establish a break in the causal connection between the 
initial illegal pretext stop and the evidence subsequently 
obtained. The Petition was denied without comment and with-
out addressing that the Court of Appeals' decision had been 
based upon the erroneous conclusion that Arroyo's counsel 
had mislead the trial Court and the State by stipulating 
that Arroyo had consented to the search of his vehicle. Mr. 
Arroyo seeks review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 
on these same issues. 
B. Pertinent Facts. 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15, 1987, Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper, Paul Mangelson, was driving home 
after completing his shift an hour earlier. Trooper 
Mangelson was driving southbound on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah, 
when he observed a northbound truck-camper allegedly follow-
ing the car in front of it too closely. Trooper Mangelson 
executed a U-turn through the median and caught up with 
Arroyo's truck. 
Trooper Mangelson claimed that the truck was following 
the vehicle in front of him at a distance of three to eight 
car lengths at a speed of approximately 50 mph. Trooper 
Mangelson pulled along side the truck in order to observe 
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its occupants and estimate the truck's speed. Trooper 
Mangelson noted that Arroyo and his passenger were hispanic, 
and that the vehicle had out of state license plates. 
Arroyo, the driver, was cited for "Following Too 
Closely" and for Driving on an Expired Driver's License. 
Trooper Mangelson then requested permission to search the 
truck, and Arroyo agreed. 
The search revealed approximately one kilogram of co-
caine inside the passenger door panel. Trooper Mangelson 
then arrested Arroyo for possession of a control substance 
with intent to distribute in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1986), second degree 
felony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT 
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL STIPULATED THAT ARROYO HAD CON-
SENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE IS CONTRARY TO THE 
RECORD AND IS THEREFORE A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM 
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Before the trial court, Petitioner's counsel erroneous-
ly challenged only the propriety of Arroyo's initial stop. 
The additional issues of the 1) voluntariness of Arroyo's 
consent and 2) the question of whether the government could 
establish a break in the causal connection between a pretext 
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stop and the evidence obtained from the "consent" should 
also have been addressed at the suppression hearing. How-
ever, counsel's oversight in this regard was precisely 
that—an oversight. No devious intent was conjured or con-
templated by Petitioner's counsel. Instead, Petitioner's 
counsel incorrectly believed that the trial court's inquiry 
ended with the determination of whether Trooper Mangelson's 
stop of Mr. Arroyo was unconstitutional. Although State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), has instructed 
counsel that a search conducted pursuant to a voluntary 
consent can purge the taint from a prior illegal stop, that 
case had not been decided until after the suppression hear-
ing held in the lower court. 
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the trial court's 
order of suppression, based its decision at least in part 
upon the erroneous interpretation of the record that Arroyo, 
through his counsel, had stipulated that Arroyo had con-
sented to the search. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the 
facts when it concluded that Arroyo's counsel had entered 
into such a stipulation. 
At the suppression hearing, the State's counsel 
endeavored to probe the question of whether Arroyo's "con-
sent" was voluntary. Arroyo's counsel objected on the basis 
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that the only relevant issue was whether the original stop 
was a pretext. Admittedly, counsel was in error. Neverthe-
less, the trial court agreed and sustained the objection. 
However, Arroyo's counsel did not at that time stipulate 
that Arroyo had consented to the search of the vehicle. In 
fact, the only representation made in that regard was made 
by the State's counsel, and not Arroyo's counsel. The 
colloquy was as follows: 
Trooper Mangelson: I approached the vehicle. I 
asked for a driver's license. I made as many 
observations about the vehicle as I could. 
Question (Don Eyre, Juab County Attorney): Descr-
ibe what you observed. Answer: I observed . . . 
Mr. Bugden: Your Honor, for the record, I think I 
would object to any further inquiry at this point. 
My motion only goes to the propriety and the law-
fulness of the stop. And I think that is what . . 
The Court: Was this a consent search? 
Mr Eyre: Yes, sir. 
The Court: I think that is true, counsel. It goes 
strictly to the stop. 
Mr. Eyre: O.k. Question: Anything else about 
the stop that you recall that you have not pre-
viously testified to? Answer: I don't believe 
so. 
Page 40, transcript of Suppression Hearing. 
Thus, the record discloses that it was Mr. Eyre, the 
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Juab County Attorney, who asserted to the trial court that 
the search was a consent search. By ruling that Arroyo's 
counsel stipulated that Arroyo consented to the search, the 
Court of Appeals committed manifest error. This was com-
pounded when the Court of Appeals decided to punish the 
defendant because his counsel allegedly mislead the State 
and the court by "stipulating that consent was given and 
then preventing the State from exploring the circumstances 
of the consent." The Court of Appeals concluded that the 
appropriate sanction for this alleged misconduct was to find 
a fact and a conclusion of law for this first time on ap-
peal. That is to say, the Court of Appeals found the fact 
of consent based upon a stipulation which the record demon-
strates was never entered into. Moreover, to punish coun-
sel, the Court of Appeals also held both factually and as a 
conclusion of law that the consent was voluntarily given. 
The record is devoid of any facts to support this legal con-
clusion. 
The Court of Appeals also placed special significance 
on the trial court's Finding of Fact 18. That Finding of 
Fact states "the trooper requested permission to search the 
Defendant's vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the 
search of the vehicle." Based on this Finding of Fact, the 
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Court of Appeals stated, "the trial judge specifically found 
that Arroyo consented to the search of his truck, and there 
was nothing in the record to contradict this finding." By 
this statement, the Court of Appeals seems to have concluded 
that the trial court considered the consent issue. It did 
not. 
Because both Arroyo's counsel and the trial court 
erroneously believed that evidence which would not have been 
discovered "but for" the prior illegal stop was per se 
inadmissable, absolutely no facts were presented in connec-
tion with the consent issue. The trial court found nothing 
more in Finding of Fact 18 than that Trooper Mangelson 
requested permission to search Arroyofs truck and Arroyo 
agreed or consented. The record contains no findings to 
support a conclusion of voluntary consent. See State v. 
Sierra, 754. P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The trial court 
entered no conclusions of law concerning either consent or 
the voluntariness of that consent. 
POINT II: THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED BOTH THE 
CONSENT ISSUE AND THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONSENT 
ISSUE CONTRARY TO ITS DECISION IN STATE V. SIERRA, 754 
P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The case at bar is not unlike Sierra, supra. In 
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Sierra, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the 
trial court to make sufficient findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on whether 1) Sierra's consent was volun-
tary and 2) whether the evidence was procured by exploita-
tion of the primary illegality or instead was obtained by 
means sufficiently distinguishable from the initial illegal 
stop. In Sierra a remand was ordered because so many fac-
tual issues were unresolved and undeveloped in the record: 
The State has the burden of proving that 
Sierra's consent was, in fact volun-
tarily given. Bumper v. State, 391 U.S. 
543, 548, 88S.Ct. 1788, 1791, 20 L.Ed.2d 
797 (1968). The record below merely 
indicates that, according to Officer 
Smith, Sierra offered to let him search 
the trunk of the car. The record con-
tains no facts indicating Sierra con-
sented to Officer Smith's search of the 
interior of the car, where he discovered 
the incriminating evidence. Nor does 
the record reveal exactly how Officer 
Smith went from searching the trunk of 
the car to searching the passenger side 
of the interior; how Officer Smith came 
to searching underneath the car and 
looking at the gas tank; how Officer 
Smith retrieved the keys to the car to 
verify the gas level reading; nor how 
Sierra responded, if at all, to Officer 
Smith's conduct. A translator was re-
quired for Sierra at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, which supports his 
claim that he had difficulty communicat-
ing with Officer Smith. The district 
court did not find that Sierra's consent 
was voluntary nor did it find that the 
evidence procured was not obtained by 
the officers' "exploitation of [the pri-
11 
mary illegality]" and "sufficiently dis-
tinguishable" from the initial illegal 
stop. (Emphasis supplied, Id. at 981). 
In the instant matter these same deficiencies in the 
record exist. Because Arroyo's counsel and the trial court 
incorrectly applied a "but for" test, no facts were pre-
sented in connection with the consent issues. The consent 
and the attenuation issues are separate and distinct: 
By definition, then, Fourth Amendment 
"voluntarines" necessarily requires a 
finding by the district court that the 
evidence was obtained freely and not by 
police "exploitation of [the primary] 
illegality . . . Wong Sun, supra 371 
U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417, making 
the two findings mutually exclusive. 
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 
1150 (10th Cir. 1986). (Emphasis sup-
plied) . 
The omission in this regard does not justify a reversal; 
instead, a remand is appropriate. The Petitioner submits 
that just as in Sierra this case should be remanded to the 
trial court for a further determination of both the volun-
tary consent and the attenuation of taint issues. 
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POINT III: THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT 
THE VOLUNTARY CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER NECESSARILY 
ESTABLISHED A BREAK IN THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE ILLEGAL PRETEXT STOP AND THE EVIDENCE SUBSEQUENTLY 
OBTAINED IS IN CONFLICT WITH ESTABLISHED LAW. 
Even if it is assumed, contrary to the record, that the 
trial court did consider the consent issue, the 
admissibility of the challenged evidence cannot be correctly 
decided unless the trial court found from the evidence a 
break in the chain of illegality. In order to admit the 
challenged evidence, the trial court must have entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Arroyo's con-
sent was his free and voluntary act. However, in the in-
stant matter, this issue was never reached by the trial 
court. Rather, the Court of Appeals entered this Finding of 
Fact for the first time on appeal as a punishment for what 
the Court of Appeals perceived to have been inappropriate 
conduct by Petitioner's counsel. Yet even if there was a 
voluntary consent by Arroyo, the record is still devoid of 
any Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law on the issue of 
whether the State established a break in the causal connec-
tion between the illegal pretext stop and the drugs 
subsequently obtained in the search of the vehicle. The 
Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that such a Finding of 
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Fact and Conclusion of Law had been made by the trial court 
when none in fact had been made. Finding of Fact 18 does 
not support a conclusion of law on the voluntariness of the 
consent• 
The Court of Appeals' assumption that a voluntary con-
sent necessarily vitiates or attenuates the taint of a prior 
illegal stop is contrary to the decisional law which has 
developed on this point. Indeed, the Arroyo decision con-
tradicts the Court of Appeals own decision to remand in 
Sierra. Notwithstanding a finding of voluntary consent, 
courts have frequently held that the State has not carried 
its burden to purge the primary illegality of the Wong Sun 
taint. 
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1982), a suspect's 
consent to search his two suitcases was tainted by his il-
legal detention and was ineffective to justify the search of 
his two suitcases. Royer was approached at an airport by 
detectives who asked for his airline ticket and driver's 
license. Without returning the ticket and license the de-
tectives asked Royer to accompany them to a small room. 
After obtaining Royerfs luggage from the airline without his 
consent, he then produced a key and unlocked one suitcase. 
Drugs were found in that suitcase. Royer then indicated to 
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the detectives that he did not know the combination to the 
lock of the second suitcase. When asked if he objected to 
the detective opening the suitcase, Royer said, "no, go 
ahead," and did not object when the detective further 
explained the suitcase might have to be pried open. The 
trial court concluded that Royerfs consent to the search 
was "freely and voluntarily given". The Florida District 
Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that "at the time his 
consent to search was obtained, he was unlawfully confined 
and consent to search was therefore invalid because tainted 
by the unlawful confinement." 460 U.S. at 495. The Florida 
Court of Appeals held that because there was no proof in a 
"break in a chain of illegality" the consent was invalid as 
a matter of law. In affirming the suppression order, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
Because we affirm the Florida District Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that Royer was being illegally 
detained when he consented to the search of his 
luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by 
the illegality . . . 
Id at 507. 
The Respondent submits that the same reasoning applies 
in the instant matter. Once the conclusion is reached that 
the Respondent was unlawfully stopped, and therefore unlaw-
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fully detained by Trooper Mangelson, then the State in the 
instant matter has the same burden that the State in Florida 
v. Royer, was unable to sustain. 
In United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 
1981), an informant contacted the DEA and provided informa-
tion that a person was selling heroin from a particular 
motel room. The informant furnished the DEA with a descrip-
tion of the individual. The DEA contacted the motel clerk 
and confirmed that the defendant matched the description 
provided by the informant. The clerk advised the DEA that 
the defendant was expecting a package. When the package 
arrived, the motel clerk contacted the DEA. The package had 
been damaged, and when the DEA agent was handling the pack-
age, it broke open and a bindle fell out. The bindle tested 
positive for heroin. Additionally, a trained dog altered 
on the package. A search warrant was then obtained and most 
of the contents of the package were seized. However, the 
defendant was permitted to pick up the package with some of 
its contents still intact. As soon as the defendant took 
possession of the package he was arrested. Permission was 
then requested to search his vehicle and a room in a dif-
ferent motel. The defendant executed written consent forms. 
Opium was found in both locations. On appeal, the issue 
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presented was whether the defendant's post-arrest consent 
w^s a sufficiently independent act to avoid the exclusion of 
the opium. The Ninth Circuit concluded that even assuming 
the consent was voluntary, "the evidence must nonetheless be 
suppressed if the unconstitutional conduct was not suffi-
ciently attenuated from the subsequent seizure to avoid 
exclusion of the evidence . . . " The Respondent submits 
that the same should hold true in the instant matter. Even 
assuming a voluntary consent, the government must still 
establish that the consent sufficiently attenuated the taint 
from the prior unlawful pretext stop. In Taheri the gover-
nment was unable to carry its burden: 
The government, which bears the burden of showing 
admissibility in these circumstances . . . points 
to no intervening events or lapse of time which 
would show Taheri's consent was sufficiently an 
act of free will to purge the primary taint of the 
unlawful invasion. 
Id at 601. 
For that reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the opium was 
inadmissible. 
Similarly in United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th 
Cir. 1982), the Court stated, "we hold, as a matter of law 
on the undisputed facts of the record, that Gooding's il-
legal seizure tainted all that ensued in the investigative 
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encounter, and that his consent to the initial search, even 
if voluntary, did not vitiate the taint." Id at 84. The 
Gooding court suppressed the evidence. The Court held as 
follows: 
The connection between the illegal seizure and the 
consent—all occurring within the same brief, 
continuous encounter--was not sufficiently attenu-
ated to remove the former's taint from the 
ultimate fruits of a search. 
Id at 84. 
In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 
1985), the Court focused upon the question of whether the 
consent to search was valid despite the unlawful seizure and 
detention of the Defendant. In Recalde, the District Court 
held that the consent was knowing and voluntary. In the 
instant matter, there was no such finding. 
By focusing only on the voluntariness of the Defen-
dant 's consent and by not considering whether he had been 
unlawfully seized, the Recalde court concluded that the 
District Court had misapplied the Supreme Court decisions 
governing the issues. Id at 1457. "The Court therefore did 
not make its finding in light of the requirement that such 
consent be free from the taint of the illegal detention. 
Because of this, and because of the illegal nature of 
Recaldefs seizure and detention are critical, we conclude 
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that the District Court's finding of consent is clearly 
erroneous." Id at 1458. Thus, notwithstanding that Recalde 
executed a written consent form, the Court, held that the 
consent was tainted by his prior illegal arrest and deten-
tion. The Respondent submits that the same conclusion will 
be borne out by the evidence in the instant matter. 
Finally, in State v. Mitchell, 360 So.2d 189 (La. 
1978), the Louisiana Court was confronted with the same 
issue of assuming the post-arrest consent after an illegal 
arrest, was the consent a product of free will rather than 
exploitation of the prior illegal arrest. In deciding this 
issue, the Court held, "we think that the uncontradicted 
evidence clearly shows that the defendant's "consent" for 
the officers to search his residence was coerced through 
their exploitation of the immediately preceding illegal 
arrest and unconstitutional search of his vehicle. Id at 
191. 
The Petitioner submits that all of these cases support 
the proposition that even assuming a voluntary consent, a 
determination must still be made whether the consent was a 
product of the prior illegal stop. In the instant matter, 
for the reasons already stated, no such determination was 
ever made by the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Arroyo respectfully re-
quests that this Petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted 
and that the matter be remanded to the trial court for a 
Sierra hearing on the consent and attenuation issues, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /'" day of Muiuh, 1989. 
WALTER Y( BUGDEN, JR., 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and cor-
rect copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, this day of March, 1989 to: 
Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Sandra Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
20 
APPENDICES 
21 
34 State v. Arroyo 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 
CODE• CO 
.Utah 
Marveon previously moved for dismissal on this 
very ground. That motion was denied by the Utah 
Supreme Court before the case was transferred to 
this court. We are not inclined to disturb the 
Supreme Court's disposition of this issue and reject 
Marveoo's jurisdictional challenge. See Coader v. 
A.L. Williams A Assoc*., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
3. On the contrary, the 'strict construction* rule 
that is employed in connection with insurance poli-
cies accomplishes just the opposite result. Any 
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is 
construed in favor of coverage. Sec, e.g., Fuller v. 
Director of Finance; 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 
1985) ('An insured is entitled to the broadest prot-
ection he could have reasonably understood to be 
provided by the policy/); Williams v. First Colony 
Life IDS. CO., 593 PJd 534, 536 (Utah 1979) 
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed 
in favor of insured); Dienes v. Safeco Life IDS. CO., 
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 <1968) (no 
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an 
insured). See also Colard v. American Family MuL 
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an 
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage 
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence, 
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American 
Excess Ins. Co. v. MOM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729 
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurant* contracts are 
construed to accomplish the object of providing 
indemnity to the insured); Wddon v. Commercial 
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89, 
91 (1985) ('When an ambiguity exists, the court 
must construe the policy so as to sustain indem-
nity.*). 
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit lang-
uage dearly indicating an intent to provide coverage 
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the 
question of whether such coverage was intended. 
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through 
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather 
than by invoking the stria construction rule. See 
generally Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 p.2d 
582,585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The State of Utah filed an interlocutory appeal 
challenging the district court's suppression of 
cocaine seized after a Utah Highway trooper 
stopped Jose Francisco. Arroyo ("Arroyo") for an 
alleged traffic violation. The trial court found the 
Jtor> of Arroyo's vehicle was a pretext stop which 
violated Arroyo's fourth amendment rights. We 
reverse. 
FACTS 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15, 
1987, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mang-
ebon ("Trooper Mangdson") was driving home 
after completing his shift an hour earlier. Trooper 
Mangeison was driving southbound on 1-15 near 
Nephi, Utah, when be observed a northbound 
truck-camper following the car in front of it too 
closely. Trooper Mangeison made a U-turn 
through the median and caught up with Arroyo's 
truck. 
Trooper Mangdson observed that the truck was 
following the vehicle in front of him at a distance 
of three to eight car lengths at a speed of appro-
ximately fifty miles per hour. Trooper Mangeison 
pulled alongside the truck in order to observe its 
occupants and estimate the truck's speed. 
Trooper Mangdson noted that Arroyo and his 
passenger were Hispanic, and he stopped the 
truck. 
Arroyo, the driver, was dted for "following too 
dosdy* and for driving on an expired driver's 
license. Trooper Mangdson then asked Arroyo if 
he could search his truck, and Arroyo agreed. 
The search revealed approximately one kilo-
gram of cocaine inside the passenger door pand. 
Trooper Mangeison then arrested Arroyo for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-«<lXa)(D (1906), a second degree felony. 
Arroyo moved to suppress the cocaine claiming 
Trooper Mangdson's traffic stop was a pretext to 
search his truck for evidence of a more serious 
crime. The trial court found no traffic violation 
had occurred and ruled that Trooper Mangdson's 
stop of Arroyo's truck was a pretext to investi-
gate a vehicle lie found suspicious because of out-
of-state license plates and Hispanic occupants. 
The trial court found Arroyo consented to the 
subsequent search of his truck, but nevertheless, 
granted the motion to suppress. The State 
The issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that Trooper Mangdson's 
stop of Arroyo for "following too dosdy" was a 
pretext stop, and (2) whether Arroyo's subseq-
uent consent to, the search of his truck purged the 
Uimofthcotherwiseuiwxmstitutionalstop.1 
The trial court's factual evaluation underlying 
its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
wffl not be disturbed unless it is dearly erroneous. 
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since the trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the witnesses' credibility. Stale v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
However, in reviewing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon those findings, we afford 
no deference and apply a correction of error sta-
ndard. Gates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 
1988). 
PRETEXT STOP 
We first consider whether Trooper Mangelson's 
stop of Arroyo's truck was incident to a lawful 
stop for a traffic violation or was a constitution-
ally defective 'pretext* stop. A police officer may 
stop a vehicle for a traffic violation committed in 
the officer's presence. Nevertheless, a police 
officer may not 'use a misdemeanor arrest as a 
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious 
crime/ Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. Courts must look 
to the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether a stop for a traffic violation and subse-
quent arrest is a pretext. This involves "an obje-
ctive, assessment of the officer's actions in light of 
the facts and circumstances confronting him at 
the time/ Id. The actual state of mind of the 
officer at the time of the challenged action is irr-
elevant. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 
U.S. 463 (1985)). Thus, in this appeal, the ques-
tion is whether a reasonable officer, in view of 
the totality of the circumstances of this case, 
would have stopped Arroyo for "following too 
closely/ The proper focus is not on whether 
Trooper Mangelson could have validly made the 
stop. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. 
Trooper Mangelson observed Arroyo following 
the vehicle in front of him at a distance of 
between three and eight car lengths at a speed of 
approximately fifty miles per hour. It is notewo-
rthy that Trooper Mangelson had completed his 
shift an hour earlier, and was driving home in the 
opposite direction from Arroyo when he observed 
the alleged traffic violation, one for which .very 
few citations are issued.2 Trooper Mangelson did 
not stop Arroyo until he had pulled alongside the 
truck, and observed that the occupants were 
Hispanic, having already noted that Arroyo was 
driving a truck with out-of-state license plates. 
We agree with the trial judge that the stop was 
an unconstitutional pretext to search for drugs. 
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer would 
not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for 
"following too closely" except for some unartk-
ulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
CONSENT 
Our inquiry does not end with the determination 
that Trooper Mangelson's stop of Arroyo was 
unconstitutional. We must next consider whether 
Arroyo's subsequent consent to the search of his 
truck purged the taint of the illegal stop thereby 
making admissible the cocaine seized. The appr-
opriate inquiry is "'whether, granting establish-
ment of the primary illegality, the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been come at 
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
the primary taint.'" Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980 
(quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471,487-88(1963)). 
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"The United States Supreme Court has rejected 
a *but for9 exclusionary rule for evidence seized 
as a result of prior illegality/ Id. (citations 
omitted). Thus, even though this evidence would 
not have been discovered "but for* the prior 
illegal stop, the evidence is not per se inadmiss-
ible. Id. Moreover, a search conducted pursuant 
to voluntary consent purges the taint from the 
prior illegality. Skrn, 754 P Jd at 980 (citing Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-
88 (1963)). Accord United States v. Carson, 793 
F.2d 1141, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 1986), cert, 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 315 (1986); State v. Aquilar, 
758 ?J2d 457, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). To 
determine whether consent is voluntary, we look 
to the totality of the circumstances to see if the 
consent was in fact voluntarily given and not ihe 
result of "duress or coercion, express or 
implied." Sierra, 754 P M at 980 (quoting Scn-
neckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973)). The State bears the burden of proving 
that consent was voluntarily given. Siena, 754 
PJdat981. 
In this regard, we note Arroyo did not contest 
the State's argument at the suppression hearing 
that he voluntarily consented to the search of his 
truck. Arroyo, through his counsel stipulated that 
he consented to the search. Arroyo's counsel 
objected when the State attempted to offer evid-
ence to establish Arroyo's consent was voluntary, 
claiming it was not relevant as the only issue was 
whether the original stop was a pretext. As a 
result, the trial court limited testimony concerning 
the circumstances surrounding Arroyo's consent. 
The trial judge specifically found that Arroyo 
consented to the search of his truck, and there is 
nothing in the record to contradict this finding. 
For the first time on appeal, counsel now 
argues that Arroyo's consent was not voluntary 
as there was no "break in the causal connection 
between the illegality and the evidence thereby 
obtained." United States v. Recakk, 761 F.2d 
1448, 1458 (10th Or. 1985). However, this argu-
ment should have been made below. A defendant 
cannot mislead the State and the court by stipul-
ating that consent was given, thus preventing the 
State from exploring the circumstances of the 
consent, and then argue for the first time on 
appeal that the consent given was not voluntary. 
Based on these circumstances, we conclude that 
defendant's stipulation included that the consent 
was given voluntarily. 
Thus, although the original illegal stop was 
unconstitutional, Arroyo's subsequent voluntary 
consent purged the taint from the initial illegality, 
and the motion to suppress should not have been 
granted. 
Accordingly, the order granting Arroyo's 
motion to suppress the evidence is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for trial. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
1. Our analysis is confined to the protections 
granted under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution rather than article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. Arroyo attempts to raise 
the state constitutional issue as has been encouraged 
by our Supreme Court. See, eg., 1) SiMte v. Laff-
eriy, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988); 2) Stare 
v. Earl 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). However, a 
three line conclusory statement as to the greater 
scope of state constitutional protections is an insu-
ffient briefing for us to embark on a state constit-
utional analysis and we, therefore, refuse to do so. 
When analyzing state constitutional issues, our 
Supreme Court has cited with approval the appr-
oach taken in Stare v. Jcwctt, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 
233(1985). 
2. Toooper Mangclson testified that he had issued 
only three or four citations for 'following too 
closely* in 1987. 
Cite is 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Wendell Taylor appeals the trial court's entry 
of summary judgment against him. Wendell 
argues that 1) summary judgment was inapprop-
riate due to unresolved issues of material fact 
regarding the validity of his deceased brother's 
alleged will; 2) a document favorable to him 
should be given effect as his brother's will, even 
though it does not strictly comply with the Utah 
Probate Code; and 3) the trial court erred in 
ordering Wendell to pay a portion of defendants' 
attorney fees. We affirm in large part, but 
remand for reassessment of one aspect of the 
court's judgment. 
dvT RCP. 36 ~ "" " ~ _ _ _ Provo»Utd» 
FACTS 
In January 1984, Grant Taylor loaned a sum of 
I money to his brother, plaintiff Wendell Taylor. 
j At the time of the loan, Grant had been divorced 
I for about one month from his wife of more than 
I forty years, defendant Esther Taylor. On June 30, 
I 1984, Grant dictated a document to a second 
I brother. Nod Taylor, providing that the loan to 
Wendell be forgiven upon Grant's death. Noel 
typed this document and Grant signed it in the 
presence of Nod and Nod's wife, Geraldine. 
Nod then signed the document as a witness and 
filed it away. Geraldine did not sign the document 
; at that time. 
Shortly after executing the June 30 document, 
Grant, who had been ill with cancer, worsened 
considerably. On August 30. 1984, he executed a 
document entitled 'Last Will and Testament* In 
this document. Grant made no provision for his 
former wife, Esther, nor did he mention the debt 
owed by Wendell or the June 30 document forg-
iving the debt. The will recited that the bulk of 
Grant's estate go to a trust, created the same 
date, in favor of his children. 
Grant and Esther remarried on September 21, 
1984, approximately ten months after their 
divorce. The trust Grant established on August 30 
was immediately amended to include Esther as a 
beneficiary. At the time of the remarriage. 
Grant's cancer had rendered him unable to walk 
or speak audibly and he died five days later. 
Shortly thereafter, bis estate was informally pro-
bated pursuant to the August 30 will. 
Following Grant's death, efforts were made to 
obtain repayment from Wendell of the money 
Grant had loaned him. Unaware of the June 30 
document forgiving the debt, Wendell complained 
of these efforts to Nod, at which time Nod inf-
ormed Wenddl of that document. However, the 
document was not located and delivered to 
Wendell until early 1985. In October of that year, 
Wendell filed'this action to invalidate the previ-
ously probated August 30 document and give 
testamentary effect to the terms of the original 
June 30 document forgiving repayment of the 
loan made by Grant. 
Wenddl claimed that the June 30 document 
was actually Grant's last valid will, the August 30 
document being a product of duress or undue 
. influence. Wenddl attached to his complaint a 
copy of the June 30 document bearing only the 
signatures of Grant and Nod. Based on the fact 
that the purported will bore the signature of only 
one witness, defendants* counsd filed a motion 
to dismiss Wendell's complaint. Two days before 
defendants' motion to dismiss was to be argued, 
Wendell filed an affidavit in which he claimed 
that the document attached to his complaint was 
not an accurate copy of the June 30 document. 
Attached to his affidavit was another copy of the 
document bearing the additional witness signature 
of Geraldine Taylor. Accordingly, defendants' 
motion to dismiss was continued as it only addr-
essed the validity of a document bearing one 
witness signature. 
Defendants' counsd promptly deposed Nod 
and Geraldine Taylor. Geraldine testified that she 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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S t a t e o f U t a h , 
P i .11 jit i f i <in Il Ap|)c I il .inill 
v. 
Jose Francisco Arroyo, 
D e i e n d d ill dim! Respujiidkiinf • ) 
ORDER 
No, 880062-CA 
This in a titer' is before the c.....:::. upon a Pet I tion for 
Rehearing filed by the Respondent. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respom lent .*s P e t i t :i « )i i fi i : 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 22nd day of Match l*<89. 
9L MM "U 
Mary T. JfJoo#an 
ClerkCdf ' the Coi 11: II:: 
APPENDI> 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. #480 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 r * oi oi.cn« u«>- ^ 
r mi i, i\ P 
JA.: C ; : ; J 
>h JUAB COUNTS i l A I - * *. TAH 
-ooOoo • - ral p- GrcenwoocX'srL 
FINDING'S OF FACT, 
.Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LA W 
AND ORDER 
v. : 
lOSF i NAN' I ," O'J' ARROVO, ^ : 
Defendant. : Case Nc» 81- D 
- — - --ooOoo 
On De :emb<- - * > ; 
came on before this Court for ai I Evidentiary Hearing, The 
* e was represented by ' its attorney, Dona1d J Eyre, Ji 
the Defendant WH« fj r ca *. t* I I f in JM»T SI HI ami i epr nsen tf*il li, 
his counsel, Walter F Bugden, Jr. Highway Patrol Trooper 
Paul Mangelson and the Defendant Jose Francisco Arroyo botl i 
t e s t i f i c d a t t! :«. i c h e a r i n g 1 t f t: e i g i v i z i g c a:::: e f u 1 c o i I s I d e r a. 11 o n 
to the testimony presented at \r^~ hearing, the demeanor of the 
witnesses on the witness stand reviewing memoranda and case 
law submit t: e d t o t h e C o i i i t: > u i I s e ] a n d 1 1 s t e i i i n g t: o 
oral argument, this Cour t enters the follow.! ng: 
APPENDIX C 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 15, 1987, at approximately 4:00 p.m. 
the Defendant, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was the driver of an 
older model Ford Pick-up with a camper. The vehicle was 
headed in the northbound direction on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah. 
2. On the same date, and at the same time, Highway 
Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was driving in a southbound 
direction on 1-15 when he observed the truck driven by the 
Defendant proceeding in a northbound direction. 
3. The Defendant testified he was driving in a group or 
cluster of three cars, his vehicle being the third vehicle in 
the group. Trooper Mangelson testified that he only saw two 
vehicles in the northbound direction and that the Defendant's 
vehicle was the rear vehicle. • 
4. Trooper Mangelson observed that the Defendant's 
vehicle had out of state (California) license plates. 
5. In July of 1987, Trooper Mangelson attended a 
seminar which focused upon the types of individuals who 
transport controlled substances and the types of vehicles that 
said controlled substances are transported in. 
6. Trooper Mangelson testified that by in large the 
Utah Highway Patrol had found that most drug trafficing was 
done by Colombians, Cubans, and Hispanics. 
7. Trooper Mangelson also testified that one of the 
topics discussed at the seminar was the necessity for having a 
reason to stop an automobile driven by a Colombian, Cuban, or 
-2-
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a i , H i s p a i i i ::: I i: c o p e i: M a i 1 g e 'II s ::: i: i i n d e i s t: o o d 1:1 i a t 1 i e «::: c u *3 d :i: i o t 
stop a vehi :::le just because the drivei was nf Latin origin 
8 esult Trooper Mangelsr ». <- * firing at this 
seminar • * >- Hispanic 
i',civ:aua* ar : . *r^ ^ vc».i..4t . t wanted t,. w*h the vehicle. 
: ^ Trooper also admitted that once he stopped . Hispanic 
di : ve: , out oi ' * j ' S€ji'ii i 11 1 I'M 
veh : -: . e 
TrooperMapgelson estimated the Defendant's speed 
was 50 miles per hour. As t:l \e • T. i: o o p e i ' ==; ", rel :i i c ] € • |i: .asse :! tl ie 
Defendant ^h-j <-*!<=> reading x opposi * - ^ .J ^ u o n s , t."^ * 
Trooper testified that ?* .-e^eved tne Defendarr - vehicle was 
three * - * r ^ ^  * > * 
immeci . r-. f: * Based rooper s estimate 
of i:he Defendant s speed, the Trooper testified that he 
concluded that the Def endan I! w<i<, "I il1 i ihM t><- Close ' I he 
vehicle immediately in front of II. 
10. The Trooper then executed a U-turn through the • 
m e d i a n and c a u g h t a\ i « i 1 il i l I a' I u-« f enrl^n ( s v i hi c i e w I I 11 i 11 a 
ha I f HI i I F " • : : <r from the l o c a t i o n -,. .t the i n i t i a l 
observation of the Defendant's vehicle. 
3 1. l';:?n -overtaking the Defendant "s vi I»i c 1 e t he "I rooper 
t e s t If, i e d 1: I: , a t i: a 11 i e i t h a n p u 11 i n g t h e Defendant o v e r 
immediately, he instead pulled up along side the Defendant's 
vehicle in oi dei to obserye the occupants of >*ie J>ef endan t '" s 
ie 
in oi aei to opserye the occupants 
v e h i c 1 e i i t I n ninTT ' i • ', Mi l l i l I 'Tf fancg T T P I 
- 3 -
n rf^~^ nt tfl vnhjr-»~ 7 Ml In 1 i hi' ' ', " 
thnjr f nnflnnl ' i mliirln 
12. Trooper Mangelson testified that the Defendants 
vehicle was still three to four, maybe five cars lengths 
behind the vehicle directly in front of it, and that this 
distance was unsafe, and therefore the Defendant was 
•'Following too Close" in violation of the applicable traffic 
code. 
13. When the Trooper pulled along side the Defendant's 
vehicle, the Trooper did observe that the two occupants of the 
Defendant's vehicle were of Latin origin. 
14. Under cross-examination, the Trooper denied that it 
was his normal procedure when issuing a citation to an 
individual for "Following too Close" to record the license 
plate of the front car. However, the Trooper's denial on this 
point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the 
Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter. The 
Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the license plate 
number of the front car in this case. 
15. The Defendant testified that he was at least 85 to 
95 feet or nine car lengths, behind the vehicle immediately in 
front of his own. The Court finds this testimony to be 
credible. 
16. In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded that Trooper 
Mangelson rightfully determined that the Defendant was 
"Following too Close" or that any other attested facts 
preponderated to the level necessary to permit a 
-4-
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-rnst +: tional stop * * "\* ?efendar^< -l cle. "jieovei, the 
- * - lished the 
probabi-i^* * i.&* , *oiatioi * a- c 'ru'-r^a ar * tha- * *-
alleged violation was onlv a pretext asser4 -•: hy *= Trooper 
LIS* . cense 
plates occupants <. : 1 ji.u -JV± ; m 
I * Troope: stopped h^ r efendar*- <- vehicle for 
- >o. < _, ' e 
Defendar* . * L asked .,, di. J received identification 
fx * ~he Defendant However ,pon re^* iv.r , t r; -
identification, and H ^ - • • * 
(- recent! v acquired the automobj . - - * «- Trooper did not run 
a NCIC check or. e. t * «-» tv« i: ; e: or t *- Defendant s vehicle 
(1 v e r i * y x i i •*«••-»' * ,- ~ « - i r * "-ei lied 
i ••• J i, ' i n n A *.
 A L . :.ock was standard police procedure. 
18. The Trooper requested permission t o search the 
Defendant's vehicle, and 11 :ie De:f:ei idai 11 consei 11:ed t:o 11: Ie seai ch 
c- he vehicle. 
39. Alter searching the camper portion ci v * +: 
Trooper Manqelson detected tb^i o pa*"kjje oi 
insi dr * '• r-.e passengers ' s door » After gaining access to the 
inside panel of the passengers/s door, Trooper Mangelson 
removed three bundles containing a p p r o i m <-i t« ly UIH KI lojran of 
a wliuU' powder wrapped in due t tape. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact of the Court now 
enters the following: 
- 5 -
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A stop of an automobile can only be made upon 
reasonable and articulable suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1986) or upon probable cause, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983). 
2. Trooper Mangelson lacked any reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to stop the Defendant in the case at bar. Instead, 
the stop of the Defendant by Trooper Mangelson for allegedly 
"Following too Close" was only a pretext utilized by the 
Trooper to justify the stop of a vehicle with out of state 
license plates and with occupants of Latin origin. Pretext 
stops are unconstitutional. State v. Mendoza, Slip opinion no. 
20922 (Utah Dec. 1, 1987). 
3. The pretextural stop was employed by the Trooper to 
conceal his genuine investigative purpose. Because the stop 
of the Defendant in the case at bar was unsupported by either 
articulable suspicion or probable cause, the Defendant was 
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
4. All evidence seized as a result of the Defendant's 
unlawful detention must be suppressed. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court now enters its: 
ORDER 
The stop that lead to the consensual search and seizure 
was a pretext stop and an unconstitutional violation of the 
-6-
Del enciant ' >• l i g h t t.o be f r e e from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s 
seizures under the Vourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Artic.it 1 Section M MI tin nt«jli 
I'I nist ) (i.i i. M n i M i evidence procured as a result of the 
unlawful stop of the Defendant is therefore suppressed. 
DATED this _-<j£«?ay ,,l J „ ^ ^ ^ , I YU? 
ft +~ 
Approved as 'tfo form: 
DONALD J . EYRE,/a~R~ 
Juab County A t t o r n e y 
